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Admissibility Case – Guevara Robles, 2026 FC 1134

In the Guevara Robles admissibility case, the Federal Court set aside an Immigration Appeal Division decision finding Valentin Antonio Guevara Robles inadmissible for complicity in crimes against humanity. Justice Phuong T.V. Ngo held that the IAD did not adequately address the interpretation of paragraph 15(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations or the applicant’s issue estoppel arguments.

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Federal Court decision and immigration context

In Guevara Robles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 1134, released in Ottawa on September 9, 2026, the Federal Court granted the application for judicial review. The decision was issued by the Honourable Madam Justice Ngo in court file IMM-8873-25.

The case concerned a March 7, 2025 Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) decision that found Mr. Guevara Robles inadmissible under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for complicity in crimes against humanity. The IAD also made a deportation order.

Mr. Guevara Robles is a citizen of El Salvador who sought protection in Canada after arriving in 2022. His case involved parallel proceedings before Immigration and Refugee Board divisions, including the Refugee Protection Division, Refugee Appeal Division, Immigration Division and IAD.

Earlier RAD and IAD findings

The Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) allowed Mr. Guevara Robles’ refugee claim on November 9, 2023. Applying the factors from Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the RAD found serious reasons to consider that he had made a significant and knowing contribution to crimes by El Salvador military and death squads, but concluded that his contribution was not voluntary. The RAD therefore found that he was not complicit in the crimes.

The IAD later reached a different conclusion in the admissibility proceedings. It held that paragraph 15(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations did not require it to treat the RAD’s exclusion determination as conclusive. Conducting its own analysis of the Ezokola factors, the IAD found that the applicant’s contribution was voluntary.

The Minister had also sought judicial review of the RAD decision. In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Guevara Robles, 2025 FC 761, the Court dismissed that application, finding that the RAD had reasonably applied the Ezokola factors.

Arguments on res judicata and the regulations

Before the IAD, Mr. Guevara Robles argued that the RAD’s factual findings on Article 1F(a) exclusion should be treated as conclusive in the later inadmissibility determination. He relied on paragraph 15(b) of the regulations and submitted that res judicata, specifically issue estoppel, applied.

The respondent argued that paragraph 15(b) applied only where the Immigration and Refugee Board had made a positive finding that a person committed a war crime or crime against humanity. Since the RAD had not made such a finding, the respondent submitted that the IAD could hold a de novo hearing and reach different conclusions.

The respondent also submitted that the RAD and IAD have different statutory functions, despite both considering the Ezokola factors.

Why the Court found the IAD decision unreasonable

The parties agreed that reasonableness was the applicable standard of review, and Justice Ngo agreed. The Court assessed whether the IAD’s reasons had the hallmarks of justification, transparency and intelligibility.

The Court found that the IAD had focused on the wording of paragraph 15(b), including the phrase referring to findings that a person “has committed” a war crime or crime against humanity. However, the IAD did not sufficiently address the provision’s purpose and context, even though it had recognized that section 15 is intended to avoid re-litigation in certain circumstances.

Justice Ngo held that, because competing interpretations had been put before the IAD and there was no jurisprudence addressing the provision where there had been a negative finding, the IAD needed to explain why its narrower interpretation better reflected Parliament’s intent. The omission of analysis beyond the provision’s plain language was a determinative reviewable error.

The Court also found that the IAD did not engage with the applicant’s issue estoppel argument. Although the respondent made submissions before the Court concerning the two-step framework for issue estoppel, the IAD’s reasons did not identify or analyze the relevant factors. The Court stated that it was not the role of the Court or the respondent to buttress the IAD’s reasons.

Court did not decide the correct interpretation

The Federal Court did not determine whether paragraph 15(b) applies to the circumstances of this case, whether it applies to positive and negative findings, or whether it applies only to positive findings by the Immigration and Refugee Board.

Justice Ngo stated that, on judicial review, the Court does not conduct its own statutory interpretation exercise or decide the correct interpretation. The interpretation of paragraph 15(b) was left to the IAD.

The Court also did not address the merits of the IAD’s findings concerning whether Mr. Guevara Robles’ contributions were voluntary under the Ezokola factors. It found the errors concerning statutory interpretation and issue estoppel were determinative.

Outcome and practice significance

The Federal Court granted judicial review, set aside the IAD decision and remitted the matter to the IAD for reconsideration in accordance with the Court’s reasons. No question was certified.

For immigration practice, the decision underscores that where a party raises a central argument about prior Immigration and Refugee Board findings, an administrative decision-maker’s reasons must meaningfully address that argument. In this case, the Court required a reasoned analysis of the text, context and purpose of the regulatory provision, as well as the issue estoppel submission.

This is a Federal Court decision on the reasonableness of the IAD’s reasons in this case. It does not resolve the substantive interpretation of paragraph 15(b) of the regulations.

Source: Federal Court Decisions