The Federal Court allowed a judicial review of IRCC’s decision to destroy a permanent resident card that had been returned as undeliverable. In Yilbas v. Canada, the Court found the PR Card Destruction decision unreasonable because the officer’s record did not intelligibly address whether the notice requirement in section 58(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations had been met.
PR card was returned as undeliverable
The applicant, a Turkish citizen, applied to renew his PR card on April 4, 2023. IRCC authorized the application on July 24, 2023, and mailed the card to the Ottawa address provided in the application.
The card was returned as undeliverable on August 17, 2023. On April 29, 2024, IRCC destroyed it. The Global Case Management System notes indicated that the card had been returned and that more than 180 days had passed without the applicant providing a new or alternative Canadian address.
Court found no intelligible notice analysis
Justice Southcott held that the central issue was whether the officer had unreasonably relied on section 58(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations to destroy the card. The reasonableness issue was assessed under the standard set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov.
The parties made submissions about whether mailing a PR card, rather than directing an applicant to attend at a stated time and place to receive it, could constitute notice under section 58(3). However, the Court declined to decide that broader interpretive question because it had not been comprehensively briefed and argued.
Instead, the Court identified a narrower reviewable error. The officer knew that the mailed PR card had been returned as undeliverable, but the decision record contained no analysis explaining how the notice requirement was nevertheless satisfied. The Court found that the administrative reasoning lacked the intelligibility required on reasonableness review.
Justice Southcott did not conclude that similar facts could never support a reasonable notice analysis. The Court noted there was no evidence explaining why the mailing was undeliverable, including whether the applicant had moved from the address provided.
Procedural fairness issue was not decided
The applicant had initially sought review on both procedural fairness and reasonableness grounds, although the written arguments advanced procedural fairness submissions. At the hearing, the applicant also argued that the mailing did not amount to the notice contemplated by section 58(3).
Because the Court allowed the application based on the unreasonableness of the officer’s analysis, it found it unnecessary to decide whether procedural fairness had also been breached.
Matter returned to a different IRCC officer
The Court set aside the destruction decision and remitted the matter to a different IRCC officer for redetermination, specifically on whether to issue a PR card to the applicant.
The applicant had asked the Court to require the new decision to be made according to the circumstances at the time of the original decision. The Court declined that request. Justice Southcott explained that a PR card is evidence of permanent resident status and that the Court was not deciding whether the applicant held, or was entitled to hold, that status.
As the destroyed card cannot be restored, the Court said the new officer’s task will not be to reconsider whether to destroy that particular card. The redetermination concerns whether a PR card should now be issued. No question was certified for appeal.
What the decision means
This decision addresses the adequacy of the reasons in this individual PR card matter. It does not resolve whether IRCC’s practice of mailing PR cards generally satisfies the notice requirement in section 58(3), including where a card is not returned as undeliverable.
For immigration practice, the judgment illustrates that where an officer relies on the 180-day authority to destroy a PR card, the decision record must meaningfully address the applicable notice requirement on the facts before the officer.
Source: Federal Court Decisions